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ABSTRACT
The purpose of this research is to provide empirical evidence about
what institutions are most likely to favor development in its diﬀerent
stages. Firstly, we identify the three development stages that prevailed
in the world between 1996 and 2011 according to the income classi-
ﬁcation of the World Bank corroborated with data from the UNDP
Human Development Index. Secondly, we consider that a country had
a “successful” behavior if it improved its development stage in that
period. Grouping countries based on “success”, instead of according to
the income level, allows us to introduce the dynamics of development
in the analysis. Thirdly, we formulate a panel data and a probit model
to determine the institutions that are behind the success cases. The
results identiﬁed economic freedom as the most important institution
in all development stages; governance was also found essential, but
only in the countries in the intermediate stage of development.
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1. Introduction
Determining the nature and sources of prosperity and wealth of nations has been, and
still is, one of the issues most debated by economists. Since the early 1980s, a large
number of economists and economic historians have applied institutional analysis to
the study of economic and social performance and, in so doing, have shown that
institutions1 have the power to signiﬁcantly aﬀect the incentives to accumulate, inno-
vate and incorporate new technologies and processes in a nation’s economy (Compton,
Giedeman, & Hoover, 2011). This renewed interest in the study of institutions and their
relationship with development has resulted in new theoretical and empirical ﬁndings,
new databases and new ideas (Berggren, 2003).
Man-made institutions can determine in large part whether a country will experience
economic success (Rode & Coll, 2012). The concepts of freedom and governance
encompass most of the formal economic and political institutions analyzed in research
to date; both of these concepts and their components are the focus of the analysis
developed in this paper. More speciﬁcally, in the empirical analysis, the formal institu-
tions included were either of a political (those that regulate the functioning of the state)
CONTACT Eva Medina-Moral eva.medina@uam.es Department of Applied Economics, Universidad Autónoma
de Madrid, C/Francisco Tomás y Valiente, 5, Madrid, Spain
1Humanly devised constraints that structure political, economic and social interactions (North, 1991).
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or an economic nature (those that regulate the functioning of markets)2 and the
institutional indicators used were: the Index of Economic Freedom (IEF), as developed
by the Fraser Institute (Gwartney et al. 2012); the Governance Indicator (GI), as
developed by Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi (2010)3 for the World Bank; and the
Democracy Index (DI), as published by The Economist Intelligence Unit.
Our main purpose is to provide empirical evidence on the speciﬁc institutions that
are most likely to favor economic and social performance in the diﬀerent development
stages. The empirical analysis of the institutional environment will allow for the
identiﬁcation of the channels that facilitate the interaction between institutional frame-
works and the process of development. In summary, this paper intends to contribute to
the debate on economic growth as follows.
First, it addresses one of the criticisms typically leveled at growth regressions, such as
the presence of heterogeneity across the countries analyzed. In this sense, clusters of
countries were made to deﬁne the development stages that prevailed in the world
between 1996 and 2011. The comparison of the countries comprising each group,
every year, will reveal those countries that were able to progress in terms of develop-
ment during the aforementioned period (“successful countries”). The grouping of
countries based on “success” into homogeneous clusters reduces the heterogeneity
across countries as well as the harmful eﬀects that this heterogeneity generates in the
estimation results. The idea behind this methodology is taken from Durlauf and
Johnson (1995), and it has been used by other authors such as Quah (1997), Liu and
Stengos (1999), Alfò, Trovato, and Waldmann (2008), Galor (2007), Høyland, Moene,
and Willumsen (2012) and Izquierdo et al. (2016).
Second, this paper focuses on an issue perhaps not suﬃciently addressed in the
empirical literature on institutions, related to the diﬀerent impact of institutions
according to the level of development achieved by every country. If this is the case,
not all economic policies will be equally eﬃcient in all countries, and diﬀerent actions
will have to be applied depending on the development stages on each country. Park and
Ginarte (1997), Butkiewicz and Yanikkaya (2006) and Lee and Kim (2009) show results
along this line. However, these researches do not consider some of the dynamics of
development. In particular, the groups of countries remain constant over time, not
taking into account the diﬀerences in the rates of growth between countries and the
possibility that a country changes its category in the period considered. This fact
increases the heterogeneity within the groups which, as we mentioned earlier, could
aﬀect the results obtained. This paper explores an alternative method for the creation of
clusters that incorporates the temporal dynamics in the analysis, therefore resulting in
the formation of more homogeneous groups.
Third, this research paper considers a diﬀerent concept of growth than that typically
used in empirical literature. The majority of those studies try to demonstrate the impor-
tance of institutions in the development of nations by using the GDP per capita growth as
the reference variable in the models. We try to oﬀer a broader measure of what wemean by
2Informal institutions such as traditions, beliefs, attitudes, habits of mind, codes of conduct and other cultural elements
were not considered.
3Of the academic contributions that have improved the quality of the available governance indicators the debate
between Kurtz and Shrank (2007) and Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi (2007a; 2007b) stands out as one of the most
interesting.
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economic development, based on the joint consideration of the Gross National Income
(GNI) per capita (World Bank, 2017) and the Human Development Index (HDI) which in
addition to living standards (measured by GDP pc growth), also synthesizes two basic
dimensions of human development: longevity and health; and education (United Nations
Development Programme, 2016).
Finally, the cluster methodology and the concept of “success” allow addressing one
of the limitations of growth regressions: the existence of a reverse causality between
institutional factors and economic growth. Some complex econometric methods have
provided solutions to this problem (IV or system-GMM estimation vs OLS estimation)
but these methods require either the search for suitable instrumental variables, which is
not always easy, or the use of lags in the estimation process, which presents a limitation
in the case of institutional variables because of their low temporal variability (Faust,
2007). The use of clusters in the analysis contributes to limit the impact of the presence
of endogeneity in the results obtained because economic growth, rather than the
achievement of the category of success, is to a greater extent behind the causes that
favor an institutional improvement high enough to impact on the dependent variable,
that is, to generate bias in the estimators.
This paper is organized as follows: Section II includes the clusters of countries, that
is, the development stages that prevailed in the world between 1996 and 2011. The
comparison among the countries composing each group in both years will reveal those
countries that were able to progress in terms of development during the aforemen-
tioned period. Section III shows the empirical approach for model identiﬁcation used in
the paper. Section IV, includes the results achieved by applying alternative econometric
regressions. The main conclusions are summarized in Section V. In this sense, the
results obtained, using the methodology of clusters based on the concept of “success”,
show that institutional factors are crucial to advancing development but their impor-
tance varies according to the diﬀerent development stages.
2. Stages of development in the world
Using the data of the GNI per capita, and according to the income classiﬁcation of the
World Bank, it is possible to identify three clusters, or stages of development: less-
developed, intermediate and advanced (Table 1).
2.1. Static analysis in 2011
In the cluster analysis regarding 2011, there were 62 countries in the cluster of
economies at the advanced development stage. The intermediate stage of development
included 102 countries. Lastly, the less-developed countries consisted of 35 economies
that have failed to follow the path of growth and greater liberty and that live, for the
most part, in extreme poverty. Countries known as failed states predominate in this
cluster, i.e., countries whose economies have stalled as a result of endemic problems
such as armed conﬂict, civil wars and coups. These nations are also frequently burdened
by poorly managed natural resources, adverse geographical conditions (in particular,
lack of access to the sea) and, above all, ineﬀective or negligent governments indirectly
or directly responsible for the persistent poverty of their countries (Collier, 2008).
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Figure 1 makes a comparison of the diﬀerent development stages in 2011, using the
standardized data from the HDI, the IEF, the GI and the DI (all indicators are expressed
on a scale from 0 -low institutional and development level- to 10 -high institutional and
development level-). The HDI shows a large gap between the less-developed countries
and the rest of the world, whilst the gap between the intermediate stage and the
advanced stage of development is much smaller.
Table 1. Distribution of countries by clusters using World Bank data of GNI per capita, 2011 and
1996.
A. Stage of development in 2011
Less-developed countries
Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Benin, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros,
Democratic Republic of Congo, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gambia, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Haiti, Kenya, Kyrgyzstan, Liberia,
Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mozambique, Myanmar, Nepal, Niger, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Somalia,
Tajikistan, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda and Zimbabwe.
Intermediate countries
Albania, Algeria, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Belize, Bhutan, Bolivia,
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, Cabo Verde, Cameroon, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica,
Cuba, Djibouti, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Fiji, Gabon, Georgia,
Ghana, Grenada, Guatemala, Guyana, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Jordan,
Kazakhstan, Kiribati, Laos, Latvia, Lebanon, Lesotho, Libya, Lithuania, Macedonia, Malaysia, Maldives, Marshall
Islands, Mauritius, Mexico, Micronesia, Moldova, Mongolia, Morocco, Namibia, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Pakistan, Palau,
Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Republic of Congo, Romania, Russia, Saint Lucia, Saint
Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal, Seychelles, Solomon Islands, South Africa, Sri
Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Syria, Thailand, Tonga, Tunisia, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, Uruguay,
Uzbekistan, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Vietnam, West Bank Gaza, Yemen and Zambia.
Advanced countries
Andorra, Aruba, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Bahrain, Barbados, Belgium, Brunei, Canada, Cayman Islands, Channel
Islands, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Faeroe Islands, Finland, France, French Polynesia,
Germany, Greece, Hong Kong, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Korea Rep., Kuwait, Liechtenstein,
Luxembourg, Macau, Malta, Monaco, Netherlands, New Caledonia, New Zealand, Northern Mariana Islands,
Norway, Oman, Poland, Portugal, Puerto Rico, Qatar, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, Slovakia,
Slovenia, South Korea, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Taiwan, Trinidad and Tobago, United Arab Emirates, United
Kingdom, United States and Virgin Islands (U.S.)
B. Stage of development in 1996
Less-developed countries
Afghanistan, Albania, Angola, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, Benin, Bhutan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Burkina
Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, China, Comoros, Democratic Republic of
Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, India,
Ivory Coast, Kenya, Kyrgyzstan, Laos, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Moldova, Mongolia,
Mozambique, Myanmar, Nepal, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Pakistan, Republic of Congo, Rwanda, Sao Tome and
Principe, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Tajikistan, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda, Vietnam, Yemen,
Zambia and Zimbabwe.
Intermediate countries
Algeria, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Bahrain, Barbados, Belarus, Belize, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, Cabo
Verde, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Croatia, Cuba, Czech Republic, Djibouti, Dominica, Dominican Republic,
Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Estonia, Fiji, Gabon, Georgia, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Hungary, Indonesia, Iran,
Iraq, Jamaica, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kiribati, Latvia, Lebanon, Libya, Lithuania, Macedonia, Malaysia, Maldives, Malta,
Marshall Islands, Mauritius, Mexico, Micronesia, Morocco, Namibia, Oman, Palau, Panama, Papua New Guinea,
Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Puerto Rico, Romania, Russia, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent
and the Grenadines, Samoa, Saudi Arabia, Seychelles, Slovakia, Slovenia, Solomon Islands, South Africa, South
Korea, Suriname, Swaziland, Syria, Thailand, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Ukraine,
Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Vanuatu, Venezuela and West Bank Gaza.
Advanced countries
Andorra, Aruba, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Belgium, Brunei, Canada, Cayman Islands, Channel Islands, Cyprus,
Denmark, Faeroe Islands, Finland, France, French Polynesia, Germany, Hong Kong, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy,
Japan, Korea Rep., Kuwait, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Macau, Monaco, Netherlands, New Caledonia, New
Zealand, Northern Mariana Islands, Norway, Portugal, Qatar, Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Taiwan,
United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, United States and Virgin Islands (U.S.).
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In the less-developed group, the principal disparities were in terms of economic freedom
and governance. These countries had the worst scores on indicators concerned with legal
system and property rights, rule of law and government eﬀectiveness. However, regarding
the indicator that measures the size of government, there is an inverse relationship with
regard to development because it is the advanced countries that register the lowest values.
Regarding the cluster consisting of intermediate countries, the most signiﬁcant
diﬀerence between this cluster and the advanced group was with respect to the
indicators related to governance and democracy, which are the indicators related to
government eﬀectiveness/functioning of government, regulatory quality, legal and
property rights, political stability and absence of violence, the rule of law, control of
corruption and political culture. It is worth noting the proximity between the inter-
mediate and advanced countries regarding the indicators related to freedom to trade
internationally and regulation, although the latter group did register higher values.
2.2. Dynamic analysis: 1996–2011
By comparing the composition of the clusters in 1996 and 2011, we incorporate a
dynamic component into the study making it possible to identify the “successful” group
of economies, i.e., the countries that improved their classiﬁcation in terms of their level
of development during the period according to the income classiﬁcation of the World
Bank. Countries were deﬁned as “successful” if they were in the less-developed stage in
1996 but by 2011 had moved into the intermediate stage of development. Similarly,
those countries that had passed from the intermediate stage of development in 1996 to
the advanced stage in 2011 were also considered “successful” economies.
However, in order to analyze the dynamics of development and, therefore, the success
cases in this framework, it is necessary to consider the improvement occurred not only in
economic terms but also in human development terms. It is for this reason that the success
classiﬁcation obtained from GNI per capita data of the World Bank needs to be corrobo-
rated with data from the HDI referred to the period 1996–2011 (Figure 2). In the group of
less-developed countries, there are three cases of “success” (Ivory Coast, Senegal y Sudan)
that in terms of the HDI data should be considered unsuccessful due to the low levels of this
index in both years; while there are two countries (Kenia y Tajikistan) in the “unsuccessful”
category that presents HDI levels similar to those in the “successful” category. Additionally,
the HDI growth could be measured by the distance between the point that represents the
country in the graph and the trend line of adjustment of each cluster. In this sense, the
Republic of Congo and Lesotho have registered zero or negative growth of HDI, so they are
classiﬁed in the “no success” group; while Bangladesh, Uganda and Rwanda have recorded
HDI growths of around 50%, so they will be classiﬁed within the “success” cluster.
In the case of the intermediate countries, Saudi Arabia and Trinidad and Tobago
have HDI levels well below those of the rest of the countries in their group, so they will
be considered “unsuccessful”; while the opposite case is that of Uruguay and Chile that
become part of the “success” group. On the other hand, there are two countries
(Morocco and Papua New Guinea) with a low level in the HDI in 1996 when compared
to the rest of the countries that belong to their cluster, so they are changed to the cluster
of “less-developed” and are considered successful countries according to their GNI per
capita levels.
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As a result of these changes, we obtained the new clusters (Table 2) that will be the
reference in the rest of this research. We can conclude that of those countries deﬁned as
less-developed in 1996, half of the countries moved into the intermediate group by 2011
and 19% of the countries in the intermediate group in 1996 achieved the category of
advanced economy by 2011. It is also worth noting that none of the countries analyzed
were found to have descended into a worse group than the one that they belonged to in
1996, indicative of the recent period of prosperity experienced by the global economy.
3. Empirical approach for model identiﬁcation
3.1. Some comments on growth regressions
The research into the essence of economic growth and institutions has featured inter-
esting methodological debates. The vast majority of studies within the empirical
literature on economic growth are based on Equation (1) (Barro, 1991),
lnðYiÞ  lnðY0i Þ ¼ αþ βWi þ γ lnðY0i Þ þ εi; (1)
whereby the diﬀerences in the growth rate of gross domestic product per capita (GDP
pc) between countries are related to a set of explanatory variables. This research chieﬂy
consists of cross-sectional studies, which feature a large sample of countries where the
dependent variable is the growth rate of GDP pc ðYiÞ during a particular period and the
regressors ðWiÞ are ﬂow variables (investment rate in the economy, growth rate of labor
force, international openness, government expenditure as a percentage of GDP, etc.)
Table 2. Distribution of countries by “success” using the data of GNI per capita and HDI.
A. Less-developed countries
Unsuccessful group
Afghanistan, Benin, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Democratic Republic
of Congo, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gambia, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Haiti, Ivory Coast, Kyrgyzstan, Lesotho, Liberia,
Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mozambique, Myanmar, Nepal, Niger, Republic of Congo, Senegal, Sierra
Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Tanzania, Togo and Zimbabwe.
Successful group
Albania, Angola, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Cameroon, China, Equatorial
Guinea, Ghana, Guyana, Honduras, India, Kenya, Laos, Moldova, Mongolia, Morocco, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Pakistan,
Papua New Guinea, Rwanda, Sao Tome and Principe, Sri Lanka, Tajikistan, Uganda, Vietnam, Yemen and Zambia.
B. Intermediate countries
Unsuccessful group
Algeria, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Belarus, Belize, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, Cabo Verde, Colombia,
Costa Rica, Cuba, Djibouti, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Fiji, Gabon, Georgia,
Grenada, Guatemala, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Jamaica, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kiribati, Latvia, Lebanon, Libya, Lithuania,
Macedonia, Malaysia, Maldives, Marshall Islands, Mauritius, Mexico, Micronesia, Namibia, Palau, Panama, Paraguay,
Peru, Philippines, Romania, Russia, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, Saudi Arabia, Seychelles,
Solomon Islands, South Africa, Suriname, Swaziland, Syria, Thailand, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey,
Turkmenistan, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Vanuatu, Venezuela and West Bank Gaza.
Successful group
Bahrain, Barbados, Chile, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Greece, Hungary, Malta, Oman, Poland, Puerto Rico, Saint
Kitts and Nevis, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Korea and Uruguay.
This classiﬁcation is based on the distribution of Table 1 by comparing the composition of the clusters in 1996 and
2011. Countries have been reclassiﬁed using the data of UNDP Human Development Index (see details in Section II.B):
a) unsuccessful less-developed countries: Ivory Coast, Lesotho, Republic of Congo, Senegal and Sudan; b) successful
less-developed countries: Bangladesh, Kenya, Morocco, Papua New Guinea, Rwanda and Uganda; c) unsuccessful
intermediate countries: Saudi Arabia and Trinidad and Tobago; d) successful intermediate countries: Chile and
Uruguay.
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and stock variables, which are measured at the beginning of the period (such as indexes
of educational attainment and health care, among others). The initial level of GDP pc
ðY0i Þ is included very often in these stock variables because according to the neoclassical
growth model, countries that are close to their steady state grow at a slower rate because
of the existence of conditional convergence. The individual eﬀect of each country ðεiÞ
captures other unobservable determinants of growth.
These regressions have been submitted to signiﬁcant econometric reviews (Rodrik
2005). In the ﬁrst instance, a lack of robustness in the ﬁndings is a concern because of the
existence of uncertainty implicit in the deﬁnition of the model being veriﬁed. Because of
the large number of explanatory variables that can be included in a growth regression
(Sala-i-Martin, Doppelhofer, & Miller, 2004), the same phenomenon can be explained by
diﬀerent models; however, there is no consensus on what the most appropriate model is.
To test the robustness of the results, some studies have included alternative estimations
using diﬀerent variables, whilst implementing sample control by eliminating part of the
observations, in an attempt to identify whether there are diﬀerences in the parameters of
diﬀerent regressions (Rodrik, Subramanian, & Trebbi, 2004).
Another common criticism refers to the bias and inconsistency in the estimations
due to omitted variables and the inherent problem of endogeneity. One of the most
important omitted variables in this type of regressions is the level of growth at which an
economy converges owing to the impossibility of measuring this variable (Lefort, 1997).
This unobservable eﬀect, which may be due to immeasurable diﬀerences in the types of
technology available in diﬀerent countries or due to other determinants of per capita
income in a steady state, is not represented in the regressors but in the individual eﬀect
of each country. The problem lies in the correlation between the individual eﬀect and
one of the explanatory variables used in the growth equations, the initial GDP pc level.
This correlation leads to bias and inconsistency in the estimator of the regressors’
parameter. This problem has been resolved by doing estimations using panel data
because ﬁxed eﬀects are able to control the unobservable characteristics of countries.
In contrast, the problem of endogeneity in the regressors used arises because some of
the Wi vector’s components are conceptually dependent on growth (the endogenous
variable in Equation (1)). Although the problem does not occur with the same intensity
in all components of the explanatory variable vector, it is present in some of the
components, particularly in those related to institutional factors (Rodrik et al., 2004).
Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2001), Easterly and Levine (2003) and Rodrik et al.
(2004), among others, have addressed the endogeneity problem in institutional variables
via the instrumental variables (IV) estimation, using instrumental variables related to
colonial origins and geographical endowments. However, although the use of instru-
mental variables is a statistical solution to the problem, it should be noted that within
the context of growth studies it is very diﬃcult to ﬁnd instrumental variables that satisfy
the criteria of exogeneity. Other authors have addressed the problem of endogeneity via
the generalized method of moments (GMM) estimator, which uses lagged values of the
variables as instruments. However, the use of lags is not always advisable in the case of
institutional variables due to their low temporal variability (Faust, 2007).
Finally, another criticism made to the growth regressions concerns the heterogeneity
across countries included in the sample. There are large diﬀerences between countries
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with regard to economic, social and institutional factors that aﬀect the results in terms
of their statistical signiﬁcance, making it diﬃcult to identify common patterns of
behavior. Durlauf and Johnson (1995) reject the cross-country linear model speciﬁca-
tion in favor of a multiple regime in which diﬀerent countries obey diﬀerent linear
models when grouped. According to Durlauf (2001) econometric models should consist
in large part of the identiﬁcation of patterns present in observations, rather than in
complex parametric model estimations.
Other empirical evidence support this line of thinking: Quah (1997) analyzed the
evolution of cross-section distributions to identify data patterns in the presence of hetero-
geneity; Liu and Stengos (1999) showed that initial output and schooling levels have non-
linear eﬀects on growth rates and suggested the presence of multiple regimes; Alfò et al.
(2008) found that the explanatory power of the Solow growth model was enhanced when
cross-country heterogeneity was considered; Galor (2007) segmented economies into three
fundamental regimes – slow growing economies, fast growing countries in a sustained
growth regime, and economies in the transition between these regimes; Høyland et al.
(2012) also suggested to allocate countries into groups based on a criterion of similarity and
to use the trade-oﬀ between within-group homogeneity and between-group heterogeneity;
and Izquiero et al. (2016) showed that the prioritization of the productivity determinants
seems to be speciﬁc to the income per capita group to which a country belongs.
In line with this empirical literature advocating an identiﬁcation of patterns present in
observations, the approach taken in this paper focuses on the criticism of heterogeneity
and attempts to identify the homogeneous groups of countries with common patterns of
behavior. There is some research that follows this line of work when trying to link
institutions to the growth of economies. Park and Ginarte (1997) found that intellectual
property rights matter for the developed economies but not for the less-developed
economies; according to Butkiewicz and Yanikkaya (2006), the relationship between
growth and democratic institutions are especially relevant for developing nations; while
the results of the research of Lee and Kim (2009) showed that institutions turn out to be
more important for lower-income countries than for middle- and high-income countries.
In all these cases, the groups of countries are formed according to the levels of
income, by means of alternative estimates for each of the deﬁned subsamples. The main
drawback of this grouping technique is that the groups of countries remain constant
over time, not considering the temporal dynamics of each national economy, which
could generate group changes over time. In this sense, grouping of countries based on
“success”, as described in Section II, allows the construction of more homogeneous
clusters by taking into consideration the temporal dynamics that shows which econo-
mies changed group throughout the analyzed period.
3.2. Data and methodological analysis
The main purpose of this research was to identify the factors that lead a country to be
classiﬁed as “successful”. To identify these factors, several alternative estimates were
carried out. First, the results of a panel data model (the traditional approach used in
growth regressions), which uses GDP per capita growth as the dependent variable, are
compared with those obtained using a probit model, the approach proposed in this
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paper, in which the dependent variable distinguishes between the “successful” countries
(value 1) and the other countries (value 0).
We consider the following speciﬁcation for the panel data model:
Yit ¼ αi þ
X14
k¼1
βkXkit þ γIEFIEFit þ γGIGIit þ γDIDIit þ εit; (2)
where Y is the GDP per capita growth rate. The set of regressors includes the institu-
tional explanatory variables related to economic (IEF), civil and political freedoms (DI),
in addition to good governance (GI). However, to measure the eﬀect of these variables
on the dependent variable, it is necessary to include a set of control variables (X). The
variables used (k = 13) were the ones associated with the economy (investment, savings,
research and development, technology, trade openness and population growth), educa-
tion (public expenditure on education, average years of education, education index and
school enrolment) and health (expenditure on public healthcare, life expectancy and
mortality).4 In the case of panel data analysis, the initial level of GDP per capita is used
as a regressor too, to include the conditional convergence in the analysis. Finally, α is
the constant term (ﬁxed eﬀects), β is the parameter of the control regressors, and γ is
the coeﬃcient of the institutional indexes; and i and t indicate the sample observations
(countries and years respectively). According to the methodology commonly used in
the growth literature, we aggregate the observations into ﬁve-year periods.
For the probit model we estimate two alternative speciﬁcations. First, we use the
aggregate indicators (IEF, GI and DI),
ProbðYi ¼ 1Þ ¼ 1
1þ e
ðαþ
P13
k¼1
βkXkiþγIEFΔIEFiþγGIΔGIiþγDIΔDIiÞ
; (3)
and secondly, we consider the components of the indicators,
ProbðYi ¼ 1Þ ¼ 1
1þ e
ðαþ
P13
k¼1
βkXkiþ
P5
j¼1
γIEFj ΔIEFkiþ
P6
l¼1
γGIl ΔGIkiÞ
; (4)
where j and l indicate the components of each institutional indexes (IEF and GI
respectively).
The variables were tested by means of two methods: one method measured the
variables in units (levels) and the other method measured the changes in the variables
(the average ﬁve-year growth rate in the panel data model, and changes between 1996
and 2011 in the probit model). From a statistical point of view, the results were found
to be more signiﬁcant with the latter method. These results emphasize the fact that a
country’s inclination to develop does not result from it having a high indicator value
but from registering a signiﬁcant improvement in it. Therefore, the results reported in
the following paragraphs relate to the variables measured in terms of variation, except
for the variable initial GDP per capita, which is taken in 1996, at the beginning of the
4Data from these variables were obtained from the World Development Indicators database (World Bank, 2012).
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period under analysis, and it is expressed in logarithm. In addition, the data were
standardized to compare the value of the estimated coeﬃcients.
Because of the high simultaneity inherent in growth processes, the statistical analyses
of endogeneity will be considered in both cases. In this sense, the probit estimation
limits the eﬀects of endogeneity on results, insofar as it reduces the reverse causality
between “success” (vs. growth rate) and institutions.
Furthermore, because among the “successful” countries, there was a mix of econo-
mies with diﬀerent levels of development, both less-developed and intermediate econo-
mies, the possibility existed that this mix could lead to nebulous conclusions that
obscured the existence of diﬀerent patterns according to the level of development. To
avoid this inconvenience and to achieve more accurate results, two diﬀerent probit
samples were estimated for the diﬀerent country samples. The ﬁrst sample only
included the 1996 countries from the “less-developed” cluster. In this case, the diﬀer-
ences between the countries that had managed to move into the intermediate group by
2011 and the one that had not, were analyzed. The second sample was made up of all
the countries from the group of intermediate economies in 1996, which made it
possible to compare countries that had advanced out of the group by 2011 to those
countries that remained in the intermediate group.
This way of grouping countries, based on “success”, allows us to incorporate the
economic dynamics in the analysis. Thus, since not all less-developed, or intermediate,
countries have evolved in the same way, they should not be grouped in the same group
over time. The grouping mode used in this paper takes these diﬀerences into account.
The results of this analysis will allow us to evaluate the signiﬁcance of institutions with
regard to the level of development attained by nations to detect the institutions most
relevant to the promotion of development and to evaluate whether the signiﬁcance of
these institutions remains the same throughout all development stages or varies,
depending on the particular stage or cluster.
4. Estimation results: which institutions matter?
4.1. Institutions and development: panel data analysis vs. probit analysis
In the ﬁrst instance, the results of a panel data model (the usual approach in growth
regressions), which includes all the observations of the countries analyzed by using ﬁve-
year averages for the period 1996–2011, and a probit model, which includes both less-
developed as well as intermediate countries identiﬁed in the year 1996, were compared
(Table 3). In each case, four alternative models are estimated. Due to the correlation
between the factors that measure the institutional strength of countries, the ﬁrst three
models proposed (Models (1) to (3) for panel data, Models (5) to (7) for probit) include,
in addition to the same set of control variables, the institutional factors IEF, GI and DI
separately; as such, their individual contribution to “success” can be studied in isolation.
In the last model (Models (4) and (8)), the three indicators are included together to
quantify the indicator with the greatest explanatory power.
Several estimations were run including alternative combinations of the control
variables described in Section III until model stability was achieved. The ﬁnal estima-
tions only include the control variables of the stable model (trade openness, years of
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education, savings and population growth) for which the value of the estimated para-
meter and its robust standard errors are displayed. The last rows of each proposed
model display the number of observations included in the estimation, a measurement of
the goodness of ﬁt and an exogeneity test.
The initial value of GDP per capita exerts a signiﬁcant inﬂuence upon growth rate,
and the sign of the coeﬃcient was correct according to the Convergence theory. With
respect to the control variables, the only variables that achieved any statistically
signiﬁcant results were trade openness, savings and population growth (from the
economic variables group) and average years of education (from the education
group). The estimation of panel data showed that the variables that obtain statistical
signiﬁcance in a greater number of occasions are trade openness and population
growth; while in the probit estimation they are trade openness followed by years of
education. In this latter case, the variable population growth obtained a statistically
signiﬁcant result, although with an opposite sign than expected, which may be due to
Table 3. Comparison of the panel data and probit estimates in the full sample.
Panel data analysis Probit analysis
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Initial position
Log(GDPpc1996) −1.25* −1.59** −1.85*** −1.12*
(0.71) (0.70) (0.71) (0.71)
Control variables
Trade openness 0.13*** 0.12*** 0.13*** 0.13*** 1.67*** 0.60** 0.58** 1.83***
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.44) (0.23) (0.24) (0.44)
Years of education 0.07* 0.09* −0.03 0.04 0.60*** 0.00 0.08 0.76***
(0.04) (0.05) (0.08) (0.06) (0.23) (0.18) (0.18) (0.26)
Savings −0.02 −0.02 −0.03** −0.01 −0.21 0.02 0.03 −0.26
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.26) (0.18) (0.19) (0.27)
Population growth −0.96*** −1.22*** −1.13*** −0.96*** 0.78** −0.13 −0.12 0.75**
(0.25) (0.23) (0.24) (0.26) (0.37) (0.2) (0.21) (0.38)
Intercept 8.37*** 10.22*** 11.32*** 7.84*** −0.63*** −0.4** −0.37** −0.62***
(2.93) (2.86) (2.90) (2.93) (0.22) (0.17) (0.17) (0.23)
Institutional variables
IEF: Index of Economic Freedom 0.42*** 0.42*** 0.56** 0.60*
(0.14) (0.14) (0.27) (0.34)
GI: Governance Indicator 0.00 0.00 0.25* −0.43
(0.00) (0.00) (0.15) (0.29)
DI: Democracy Index 0.06* 0.03 0.25* 0.45**
(0.03) (0.03) (0.14) (0.22)
Goodness of ﬁt
Number of observations 167 166 166 165 54 67 67 54
Number of countries 60 60 60 60 54 67 67 54
R2/Pseudo R2 0.37 0.33 0.29 0.37 0.39 0.11 0.11 0.42
Test of exogeneity
X2 test 35.11*** 17.85** 10.53 48.28*** 0.89 0.06 0.07 0.01
p-value 0.00 0.01 0.10 0.00 0.34 0.80 0.79 0.92
The table shows the results of panel data and probit analyzes for the cross section of countries. Four alternative models
are estimated: Model (1) and (5) include the Index of Economic Freedom; Model (2) and (6) include the Governance
Indicator; Model (3) and (7) include the Democracy Index; and Model (4) and (8) include three institutional factors
(IEF, GI and DI) together. The following control variables are not included in the regressions, because they did not
obtain statistically signiﬁcant results in the stable model: investment, research and development, technology, public
expenditure on education, education index, school enrolment, expenditure on public healthcare, life expectancy and
mortality. Test of exogeneity: instrumental variables = Lags (−1) in panel data and variation 1996–2000 in probit.
Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. *** Signiﬁcance at 1% level; ** Signiﬁcance at 5% level; *
Signiﬁcance at 10% level.
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the heterogeneity that exists because the sample includes less-developed countries along
with intermediate ones (this point will be treated in the next section). None of the
control variables used to measure the level of healthcare in a country obtained statis-
tically signiﬁcant results.
Regarding the institutional variables (IEF, GI and DI), the results clearly show that
these variables raise the probability of “success”, although the pattern is not as clear in
the panel data analysis for the factors that measure political institutions. In all probit
estimations, statistically signiﬁcant parameters were obtained in regressions where these
indicators were included individually (Model (5) to (7)). The estimation results that
included the three institutional factors (Model (8)) demonstrate that the IEF is the most
important institutional factor in terms of promoting the development of countries. The
DI also obtained a statistically signiﬁcant result, although the amount of its parameter is
inferior to the one of the IEF. In the case of the panel data analysis only statistically
signiﬁcant results were obtained for the IEF, which is also revealed as the main
institutional factor to favor development when this methodology is used. However,
none of the factors used to measure political institutions obtained statistically signiﬁ-
cant results, except the democracy index in the regression where this indicator was
included individually.
An exogeneity test was conducted to determine whether the phenomenon of endo-
geneity was present in the estimations. The tests used were the Hausman test for panel
data analysis and the one proposed by Smith and Blundell (1986) for dichotomous
models, which test the null hypothesis of exogeneity of the regressors. The results on
exogeneity diﬀer in both estimates. In the case of probit analysis, the results do not
allow a rejection of the null hypothesis of exogeneity. The result is the opposite in the
case of the estimation with panel data, except in the model which incorporates the GI
variable as the institutional factor. The results obtained suggest that the use of “success”
as an explained variable, rather than the growth rate of GDP, reduces the eﬀect of bias
in the estimators, which results from the endogeneity problem.5
4.2. Identiﬁcation of diﬀerent patterns: less-developed countries vs intermediate
countries
To reduce sample heterogeneity and to test whether diﬀerent factors aﬀect “success”
diﬀerently according to the level of development, two samples were examined: a
subsample of less-developed countries in 1996; and a subsample of intermediate
countries in 1996. Within each sub-sample, there is a distinction between successful
countries, which changed their group in 2011, and unsuccessful countries, which
did not.
Table 4 displays the statistical results obtained via the diﬀerent estimations proposed
for the probit model for each of the two samples examined. In this case, the institutional
factors were introduced separately (Model (1) to (3) and (5) to (7)) and together in the
last model (Model (4) and (8)). The ﬁrst thing to note is that, with regard to the
5The initial values of the institutional factors were used as instrumental variables: lags of one period of the institutional
variables were used in the case of panel data analysis; and the variation between 1996 and 2000 of the institutional
indicators was used in the probit analysis.
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goodness of ﬁt, the level of adjustment was higher in the subsamples than in the sample
that included all the observations, which highlights the importance of separating the
analysis into groups of countries to reduce the sample’s heterogeneity.
In addition, diﬀerent behavior patterns are observed according to the sample ana-
lyzed in both the set of control variables and in the institutional factors. In the case of
the control variables, and for the sample of less-developed countries, population growth
is the variable that obtains statistically signiﬁcant results in all the estimates. The
parameter has negative sign, indicating that in these countries it would be necessary
to pay more attention to the demographic aspects to obtain a greater impetus of their
economies. Education is highlighted as another of the most important factors to achieve
a higher level of development, while the trade openness variable is statistically signiﬁ-
cant only in the model that includes IEF as an institutional factor. Finally, the savings
variable was not included in the model for this sample of analysis, since no signiﬁcant
results were obtained in any case.
Table 4. Results of probit estimates in the subs amples.
Less-developed countries Intermediate countries
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Control variables
Trade openness 1.61** 0.01 −0.09 1.63** 2.41*** 2.05*** 2.44** 5.49***
(0.70) (0.24) (0.24) (0.75) (0.92) (0.77) (0.97) (1.96)
[0.25] [0.00] [−0.03] [0.25] [0.23] [0.24] [0.24] [0.35]
Years of education 0.92* 0.44* 0.48* 0.82 1.8*** 1.09** 1.26*** 4.18**
(0.57) (0.28) (0.26) (0.53) (0.56) (0.44) (0.4) (1.84)
[0.14] [0.11] [0.15] [0.12] [0.17] [0.13] [0.13] [0.27]
Savings −1.71*** −1.53*** −1.63** −4.9**
(0.63) (0.59) (0.66) (2.46)
[−0.16] [−0.18] [−0.16] [−0.32]
Population growth −3.14*** −1.23*** −0.84*** −3.09***
(1.03) (0.39) (0.32) (0.87)
[−0.48] [−0.31] [−0.26] [−0.47]
Intercept 2.71*** 0.89*** 0.7*** 2.69*** −3.31*** −2.51*** −2.39*** −8.42**
(0.92) (0.27) (0.26) (0.74) (0.96) (0.69) (0.77) (3.82)
Institutional variables
IEF: Index of Economic
Freedom
2.1*** 1.89*** 0.9*** 2.07*
(0.65) (0.58) (0.30) (1.10)
[0.32] [0.28] [0.09] [0.13]
GI: Governance Indicator 0.75*** 0.23 0.74* 0.95
(0.26) (0.35) (0.44) (1.06)
[0.19] [0.03] [0.09] [0.06]
DI: Democracy Index 0.29 −0.03 0.89*** 2.73*
(0.23) (0.46) (0.31) (1.44)
[0.09] [0.00] [0.09] [0.18]
Goodness of ﬁt
Number of observations 27 40 40 27 37 40 40 37
Pseudo R2 0.59 0.34 0.18 0.59 0.66 0.55 0.62 0.76
The table shows the results of the probit regressions for the cross section of countries. Four alternative models are estimated for
each sample (less-developed countries and intermediate countries): Model (1) and (5) include the Index of Economic
Freedom; Model (2) and (6) include the Governance Indicator; Model (3) and (7) include the Democracy Index; and Model
(4) and (8) include three institutional factors (IEF, GI and DI) together. The following control variables are not included in the
regressions, because they did not obtain statistically signiﬁcant results in the stable model: investment, research and
development, technology, public expenditure on education, education index, school enrolment, expenditure on public
healthcare, life expectancy andmortality. Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses and the marginal eﬀects in square
brackets. *** Signiﬁcance at 1% level; ** Signiﬁcance at 5% level; * Signiﬁcance at 10% level.
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However, in the sample of intermediate countries this variable is of high importance,
so that the accumulation of savings in developing economies acts as a brake on growth. In
this sample, the variables trade openness and years of education also obtained statistically
signiﬁcant results in all the estimates. However, the population growth rate was not
relevant in any of the models, so this variable was not included in the estimates.
In relation to the institutional factors, diﬀerent patterns are also observed according
to the sample analyzed. Greater economic freedom is revealed as a factor associated
with the achievement of “success” in both samples. In particular, the marginal eﬀect
(values in square brackets in Table 4) shows that the improvement of one standard
deviation in the indicator (since the data are standardized an unitary growth is equal to
increasing the value in one standard deviation) would increase the probability of
success around 30 percentage points, in the case of the less-developed countries, and
15 percentage points in the case of the intermediate countries.
The aspects related to political institutions were more signiﬁcant in the sample of
intermediate countries than in the sample of less-developed countries. Thus, in this last
sample, the GI indicator obtained a statistically signiﬁcant parameter when this indicator
was included individually (an improvement of one standard deviation in this indicator
would increase the probability of success about 20 percentage points), but lost its statistical
signiﬁcance when all the institutional factors were introduced in the model together. In the
case of the sample of intermediate countries, in the model where all the institutional factors
are present, DI obtained statistically signiﬁcant parameters and a similar value to the
coeﬃcient of the IEF indicator (improvements of one standard deviation in these indicators
would increase the probability of success about 15 percentage points).
4.3. Going deeper into the institutional indicators: probit analysis by
components
Finally, to identify the speciﬁc components of the economic freedom and political institutions
that should be prioritized in the development agenda of failing states, the probit model was
repeated for each of the two samples examined, using as institutional factors the components
of the indicators IEF andGI: six indicators in the case of the IEF and ﬁve indicators in the case
of the GI. The ID indicator was removed of the list of regressors because one component of
the GI indicator (Voice and Accountability) measures this same concept.
Because of the correlation between the components of the indicators, the incorpora-
tion of the components into the regression is done through a two-stage strategy. In the
ﬁrst stage, univariable regressions are estimated, which only include one component in
each regression. The statistical signiﬁcance obtained and the pseudo R2 allow to
establish the order of entry of the components in the second stage, in which a multi-
variable probit is estimated. At each step a new component, along with the set of
control variables, is included. Only the components that obtained a statistically sig-
niﬁcant parameter in the previous step are maintained in the model. The process ends
when the model saturates, that is to say, when the incorporation of new components no
longer lead to new statistically signiﬁcant results.
The results of ﬁrst stage are shown in Table 5. Among the factors related to
economic freedom, in the sample of less-developed countries, the freedom to trade
internationally indicator was revealed as the single most inﬂuential factor for the
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success of this kind of countries, followed by legal system and property rights and
regulation indicators. In the case of intermediate countries, the most relevant indicator
was the size of government, followed by regulation. The sound money indicator did not
obtain signiﬁcant results in any of the samples. Among the components of the GI only
regulatory quality indicator obtained statistically signiﬁcant results in both samples. The
rule of law and voice and accountability indicators were also found to be important in
explaining success in the sample of intermediate countries.
Table 6 displays the results of the multivariable probit models. The statistical results
obtained for the control variables are similar to those results described in the previous
estimates. With regard to the institutional indicators, the pattern is repeated in that the
components of the IEF have an impact on the probability of “success” in the less-
developed and intermediate groups; however, the GI components only have an eﬀect
upon the success of the intermediate countries.
Among the factors related to economic freedom, diﬀerent results were obtained in each
sample. The freedom to trade internationally indicator was revealed as the single most
inﬂuential factor for the success of the less-developed countries (an improvement of one
standard deviation in this indicator would increase the probability of success about 36
percentage points). The indicator of the legal system and property rights was also relevant
to less-developed countries, but its impact on the probability of success was lower (11
percentage points). The parameter of regulation indicator was signiﬁcant only for the
intermediate countries, increasing the probability of success about 15 percentage points.
Additionally, the components of the GI were found to be relevant only to countries
at the intermediate stage and did not provide any signiﬁcant results with respect to
countries in the less-developed group. Furthermore, the only component of the GI that
obtained a statistically signiﬁcant parameter in the intermediate countries was the rule
of law, that showed an impact in the probability of success of 9 percentage points.
In short, even taking for granted that the improvement in economic freedom
determined a higher probability of success in terms of development in both samples,
it is true that its impact was higher in the group of less-developed countries.
Table 5. Univariable probit estimates incorporating components of institutional factors as regressors.
Less-developed countries Intermediate countries
Coef. Std. err. Pseudo R2 Coef. Std. err. Pseudo R2
Index of Economic Freedom (IEF)
IEF: Size of Government 0.02 (0.19) 0.00 0.52*** (0.2) 0.14
IEF: Legal System & Property Rights 0.43*** (0.16) 0.10 −0.29 (0.26) 0.03
IEF: Sound Money 0.16 (0.22) 0.01 0.12 (0.16) 0.01
IEF: Freedom to Trade Internationally 1.00*** (0.27) 0.31 0.14 (0.19) 0.01
IEF: Regulation 0.37* (0.22) 0.05 0.38* (0.2) 0.06
Governance Indicator (GI)
GI: Voice and Accountability −0.09 (0.15) 0.00 0.22* (0.15) 0.02
GI: Political Stability: Absence of Violence 0.18 (0.13) 0.02 0.16 (0.17) 0.01
GI: Government Eﬀectiveness 0.18 (0.13) 0.02 −0.03 (0.13) 0.00
GI: Regulatory Quality 0.31* (0.18) 0.03 0.22* (0.13) 0.03
GI: Rule of Law 0.22 (0.15) 0.02 0.25* (0.14) 0.03
GI: Control of Corruption 0.15 (0.14) 0.01 0.11 (0.13) 0.01
The table shows the results of the univariable probit regressions for each sample (less-developed countries and
intermediate countries), incorporating as regressors the components of the institutional factors (IEF and GI). Robust
standard errors are shown in parentheses. *** Signiﬁcance at 1% level; ** Signiﬁcance at 5% level; * Signiﬁcance at
10% level.
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Furthermore, the results showed that the way to approach this improvement in every
group of countries should be diﬀerent, considering the dissimilar impact of the diﬀerent
indicators in each group. For instance, in the case of the less-developed countries, the
priorities would be a higher level of freedom to trade internationally and the reinforce-
ment of the legal system and the property rights. On the contrary, in the intermediate
countries the priority would be a better regulatory framework.
Governance was also a key factor, but only for the countries of the intermediate
stage. In this case, the priority would be the improvement of the rule of law. Therefore,
in the intermediate stage of development, both economic institutions, like regulatory
framework, and political institutions, like the rule of law, showed a similar impact in the
probability of success and both would play an equally important role in the political
agenda in these countries.
Table 6. Multivariable probit estimates incorporating components of institutional factors as regressors.
Less-developed countries Intermediate countries
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Control variables
Trade openness −1.03** −0.78 1.61*** 4.76* 6.18* 6.41**
(0.52) (0.75) (0.60) (2.70) (3.31) (2.82)
[−0.15] [−0.10] [0.21] [0.33] [0.42] [0.36]
Years of education 1.04** 0.99* 1.23*** 4.21 5.64* 4.76*
(0.48) (0.58) (0.41) (2.82) (3.29) (2.68)
[0.15] [0.12] [0.16] [0.3] [0.39] [0.27]
Savings −0.95** −2.77** −3.15** −4.04***
(0.44) (1.29) (1.39) (1.42)
[−0.13] [−0.19] [−0.22] [−0.23]
Population growth −2.02*** −3.62***
(0.7) (1.26)
[−0.29] [−0.45]
Intercept 0.84** 1.4** −2.08*** −7.01* −8.83* −8.13**
(0.40) (0.70) (0.66) (3.96) (4.64) (3.52)
Index of Economic Freedom (IEF)
IEF: Size of Government 0.27
(0.32)
[0.04]
IEF: Legal System & Property Rights 0.89**
(0.44)
[0.11]
IEF: Freedom to Trade Internationally 2.05*** 2.91***
(0.74) (1.11)
[0.30] [0.36]
IEF: Regulation 2.72* 3.44* 2.39*
(1.65) (1.87) (1.28)
[0.19] [0.24] [0.13]
Governance Indicator (GI)
GI: Regulatory Quality −0.65
(0.51)
[−0.04]
GI: Rule of Law 1.53**
(0.6)
[0.09]
Goodness of ﬁt
Number of observations 25 25 36 37 37 37
Pseudo R2 0.61 0.67 0.55 0.74 0.74 0.79
The table shows the results of the multivariable probit regressions, whose speciﬁcations include the components of the
institutional factors (IEF and GI) as regressors. At each step, a new component is included into estimation, according to the
order identiﬁed in the univariable probit regressions. Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses and the marginal
eﬀects in square brackets. *** Signiﬁcance at 1% level; ** Signiﬁcance at 5% level; * Signiﬁcance at 10% level.
JOURNAL OF APPLIED ECONOMICS 61
4.4. The success gap
The results of the probit model can be used to establish a rank order of unsuccessful
countries to determine which are most likely to succeed in the future and, conversely,
which countries can be classiﬁed as failing states in institutional terms. Figure 3 shows
the success gap, that is, the location of these failing states in relation to the values of the
IEF and GI as achieved by the group of successful countries. Speciﬁcally, taking into
account the minimum values registered by the successful countries, it is possible to
establish four quadrants to place the unsuccessful states in institutional terms.
The ﬁrst quadrant includes the best placed countries, that is, those with IEF and GI values
higher than the minimums recorded in the success group. In the less-developed group in
2011, within this quadrant are Madagascar, Mali, Tanzania and Malawi. Haiti and Ivory
Coast, although not within this quadrant, also have good positions in terms of IEF, the main
indicator in this group of countries to achieve success. In the intermediate group if 2011, the
countries in the ﬁrst quadrant are Eastern European countries (Bulgaria, Lithuania, Latvia
and Romania) together with African countries (Botswana, Namibia, Mauritius and South
Africa), an Asian country (Malaysia) and two Latin Americans (Costa Rica and Brazil).
At the other extreme are the failing states; these are the countries that register a low level in
both, IEF and GI indicators. In the less-developed group in 2011, the countries with a higher
institutional gap are Chad, Burundi, Myanmar, Central African Republic, Democratic
Republic of Congo, Republic of Congo and Zimbabwe. These countries are far from the
levels that the success countries of their group register in IEF and GI. Particularly, they need
to increase their progress in terms of the IEF by approximately 40% to approach ratings
equivalent to success, and 20% in terms of the GI. Within the intermediate group of 2011,
worthy of note is the case of Venezuela; its progress in terms of the IEF andGI is small, and its
institutional gap with respect to the success group, stands at 60% for the IEF case and at 40%
for the GI. For the rest of countries located in this quadrant (Argentina and Ecuador of Latin
America, Tunisia, Gabon and Algeria of Africa, together with Ukraine and Syria) score 30%
lower than the countries in the successful group with regard to the IEF and GI.
Within the group of less-developed countries, there is a group of countries with a
high institutional gap in terms of IEF: Benin, Guinea-Bissau, Nepal, Niger, Senegal,
Sierra Leone and Togo. These countries exhibited a deterioration, compared to the
successful group, of approximately 30% in terms of IEF. Also, in the cluster of inter-
mediate countries, there are a group of countries that should make institutional
improvements although, in this case, in terms of GI; we referred to a large group of
Latin American countries (Belize, Bolivia, Colombia, El Salvador, Guatemala, Jamaica,
Mexico, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Dominican Republic and Trinidad and Tobago)
along with Egypt, Fiji, Indonesia, Jordan, Russia, Thailand and Turkey. They need to
improve their GI ratings by approximately 20% to approach the success group.
5. Concluding remarks
The empirical analysis of this paper contributes to broaden the debate on the interac-
tion between institutional framework and the process of development. Although many
studies have shown that there is a positive relationship between institutions and
economic growth, this paper analyzes which institutions are the most inﬂuential for
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development and whether there are diﬀerences according to the level of development.
In order to do so, the evolutionary dynamics of the countries are considered. First,
countries are grouped in levels of development at two moments in time, and then we
identify those countries that registered movements toward a higher level of develop-
ment between these two moments. The analysis via homogeneous groups of successful
countries yields more accurate results and also contributes to the determination of
those institutions that should be prioritized in the development agenda.
In line with the results obtained in previous studies, the countries that managed to
surpass their stage of development during the period under analysis were the ones that
adopted, or potentiated, good institutions, successfully adapting them to their own
idiosyncrasies. Particularly, the empirical analysis revealed that economic freedom was
the most important institution to promoting development. Governance was also shown
to be inﬂuential, particularly with respect to intermediate economies that had moved
into the advanced development stage; however, governance was less signiﬁcant than
economic freedom.
Even taking for granted that governments must be committed to improve all
components of the institutional framework, our results show that there is a sequence
of institutional development. A country needs to ameliorate some basic institutions
before it can improve others, despite their importance. For instance, the priority for the
less developed countries must be economic freedom. There is no point trying to
strengthen governance if a country does not have as a priority the openness of its
economy to international markets and a strong commitment for the protection of the
property rights. Moreover, as countries improve their level of development, both
economic freedom and governance become priorities. According to our results, a better
regulatory framework and a stronger rule of law were signiﬁcant only for countries in
the intermediate stage of development. Perhaps this is an indicator that these aspects
become key factors only once a country has solved other more basic problems in the
early stages of development.
The existence of these diﬀerences with respect to the levels of development suggests
that governments and multilateral institutions should compile a list of diﬀerentiated
policy proposals, according to a sequence of priorities. These political proposals could
be followed by countries with diﬀerent levels of development so that the systems of
technical assistance to developing countries could be improved.
Among the countries that were unable to succeed during the aforementioned period,
those belonging to the intermediate group are better positioned than the less-developed
stages to move to a higher stage of development. To achieve this goal in the future, the
less-developed countries would have to raise their level of economic freedom by
approximately 40% to approach ratings equivalent to success. With respect to the
intermediate countries, the unsuccessful ones would need to raise their levels of
economic freedom and governance by 30%.
The results of this research show that irrespective of development stage, the engine of
economic growth in market economies is the entrepreneurial spirit and its catalyst is a
robust institutional setting where economic freedom and governance are given priority,
thus stimulating a diverse business dynamic, which encourages the creation of viable
businesses and therefore economic growth.
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